This paper estimates the cross-price elasticity of exports with respect to investment costs for bilateral relations between the US and 35 partner countries. We show that the relationship depends on country characteristics as predicted by the Markusen et al. (1996) model. When countries differ in relative factor endowments and trade costs are low, investment liberalisation stimulates exports, whereas when countries are similar in terms of relative factor endowments and size, and trade costs are moderate to high, investment liberalisation reduces exports.
I. Introduction
The rapid growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) over the last few decades, from 5% of world GDP in 1980 to 10% in 1995 (World Investment Report, 1997 , has spurred a large body of literature examining the determinants and effects of FDI. This rapid increase in FDI has occurred in the context of reductions in barriers to investment throughout the world, and the empirical evidence shows that investment liberalisation stimulates FDI. 1 The effects of FDI can be wide reaching, with evidence suggesting that FDI impacts significantly on trade, employment and factor prices. 2 Much of the empirical literature on FDI and trade has focused on whether FDI stimulates or substitutes for trade, usually with exports regressed on some measure of FDI and some other control variables. As well as suffering from the obvious endogeneity problems, this approach has produced mixed results, with some studies finding FDI to have a positive impact on trade, and others a negative impact. This is hardly surprising given the variety of different motives underlying FDI and the different types of FDI.
In this paper we focus on the trade relationship but from a quite different perspective, taking into account the fact that reduced barriers to investment can stimulate different types of FDI in different circumstances. According to theory, the impact on trade depends on the type of FDI it stimulates (see Markusen (1997) and Markusen, Venables, Konan and Zhang (1996) ). If FDI is vertical, where multinational firms geographically split stages of production, this is likely to stimulate trade. Whereas, if FDI is horizontal, where multinational firms produce final goods in multiple locations, this is likely to substitute for trade. Unfortunately, it is not possible to separate the data into horizontal and vertical FDI.
However, theory does provide some guidance by linking the type of FDI that is likely to arise to directly observable country characteristics, such as differences in relative skilled labour endowments and country size differences, and to the level of trade costs.
By providing a theoretical framework to link country characteristics to the type of FDI, the Markusen, Venables, Konan and Zhang (1996) model enables us to hypothesise the likely impact of investment liberalisation on exports. Based on this model, we postulate a relationship between investment costs and exports that depends on these country 1 For example, Carr, Markusen and Maskus (1998) have estimated that a fall in investment costs of one percent increases FDI by one percent. 2 For example, see Braconier and Ekholm (2000) , Brainard (1993 , Brainard and Riker (1997) , Ekholm (1995) and Feenstra and Hanson (1997) . Also, see Markusen for a survey of the empirical literature.
characteristics, and regress exports on country characteristics, trade costs, and investment cost using bilateral country level data for the US and 35 partner countries from 1986 to 1994. Our measure of investment costs is a comprehensive one 3 . It is an index that includes factors such as foreign investment controls, immigration laws, hiring and firing practices, anti-trust laws, state control of enterprises and the accessibility of local and foreign capital markets.
Our study also contributes to the literature in a number of other respects. First, we avoid any endogeneity problems by including investment costs instead of FDI as our explanatory variable. Second, we do not constrain the relationship between trade and investment costs to be the same across all countries. We allow the relationship to depend on differences in country size, relative factor endowments and trade costs. Third, we use a combination of different measures of trade costs in an attempt to capture its different forms. For example,
we include a trade cost index from the World Economic Forum that gives an indication of how protective firms view a country, as well as freight, tariff and distance measures.
Our results show that investment costs do have a significant impact on trade, and this effect depends on country characteristics in a meaningful way. The results indicate that investment liberalisation stimulates exports when countries differ in relative factor endowments and trade costs are not too high; yet reduces exports when countries differ in size and trade costs are high, providing some support for the theory.
These results are also interesting from a policy perspective, given that governments directly influence investment costs. A clear understanding of all the implications of investment liberalisation will also facilitate successful progress of WTO negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), affecting FDI restrictions.
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows: Section II provides an overview of the empirical literature; Section III describes the theoretical framework and develops the hypotheses; Section IV contains details of the data and discusses the results; Section V presents a summary and conclusions.
II. Empirical Literature
There are numerous studies that examine the relationship between FDI and trade, and their results have been extremely mixed. Typically, they regress exports on FDI and a host of other explanatory variables. Many earlier studies found that FDI stimulated exports, usually in cross-section regressions with either firm level or industry data (Blomström, Lipsey and Kuchycky, 1988; Weiss 1981, 1984; Swedenborg, 1979 Markusen (1995, p.171) reports that there is little evidence for the idea that tax avoidance is an important motive for FDI. It seems that firms first choose foreign production locations and then minimise taxes. In addition, average compensation could be picking up factors such as differences in human capital and/or differences in productivity, which would also stimulate FDI, rather than measuring investment costs.
Another limitation of previous studies is that they constrain the relationship between trade and FDI, or trade and 'price variables' to be the same across all countries. Pain and Wakelin (1998) tested whether the relationship between trade and FDI was indeed the same across countries and found that there was significant country heterogeneity. They regressed exports on outward and inward FDI, and a group of control variables, and tested whether the slope coefficients were the same across a sample of OECD countries. This finding should not be too surprising given the diverse motives that underlie FDI activities. We draw on Markusen et al (1996) to explain this heterogeneity in analysing the effect of investment costs in trade.
III. Theory of FDI
We link our empirical analysis to a theoretical framework developed by Markusen et al (1996) , which allows horizontal and vertical FDI to arise endogenously, depending on country characteristics and the level of trade costs. The model has two countries, two factors of production (skilled and unskilled labour) and two sectors. The assumption of different relative factor intensities for different stages of production can provide a motive for vertical FDI, and positive trade costs can provide a motive for horizontal FDI. This contrasts with previous models that predicted either horizontal FDI (Markusen, 1984) or vertical FDI (Helpman, 1984) . In the horizontal FDI models, it was assumed that there was only one factor of production so there was no factor price motivation for FDI. In the vertical FDI models, trade costs were assumed to be zero so there was no tariff jumping motive to set up a plant abroad hence horizontal FDI was ruled out by assumption.
Whether FDI is horizontal or vertical is relevant for this study as it affects the relationship predicted between trade and investment costs 5 . In general, a fall in investment costs stimulates FDI. However, whether it also stimulates trade depends on whether the increase in FDI is of the horizontal or vertical type. This framework can be used to generate the following hypotheses: (1)
The dependant variable in equation (1), X ijt , is the real value of exports from country i to country j at time t. The first four variables represent country characteristics: Y jt is real gross domestic product in country j, to capture the idea that exports depend on the size of the market to which a country exports. Standard trade theory would suggest that exports would be higher the larger the market (β 1 >0). DY ijt is the absolute difference in GDP between country i and j. We hypothesise that an increase in the difference in GDP reduces exports, that is, intra-industry trade is maximised when countries are of equal size (β 2 <0) (see Helpman and Krugman 1995) . DSKILL ijt is the absolute difference in the relative skilled labour endowments between countries i and j at time t. DCAP ijt is the absolute difference in relative capital endowments between countries i and j at time t. According to traditional trade models, larger relative factor endowment differences lead to increased volumes of inter-industry trade (β 3 , β 4 >0).
The variable TC jt measures the trade costs of country i exporting to country j at time t. We would expect that an increase in trade costs should reduce exports (β 5 <0). We include four different measures of trade costs.
The main relationship we are interested in is how investment costs affect exports, where IC jt measures the cost of a firm from country i locating a plant in country j. We hypothesise that the effect of investment costs on exports depends on whether FDI is horizontal or vertical, which in turn depends on country characteristics. Hence, we interact investment costs with country characteristics and trade costs in equation (1) . The overall effect of investment costs on exports can be examined by taking the partial derivative of exports with respect to investment costs, as given below in equation (2) . 
IV. Model Estimation

Data
The US is the world's largest exporter of goods and services and is also the largest source of FDI. It is therefore the natural reference point for testing our hypotheses.
Our data set is an extensive one. It covers US bilateral relationships with 35 countries for the period from 1986 to 1994 inclusive. (The Appendix sets out details of the countries covered, data definitions and sources.) Both OECD and developing countries are included in the sample. The dependant variable in equation (1), X ijt , is the real value of exports of non-agricultural goods from country i to country j at time t. Note that since all our observations are bilateral relations with the US, half the sample will represent exports from the US (country i) to each country j and the other half will be exports from each country i to the US (country j). The export data are free on board (f.o.b.) i.e. they do not include freight costs. 6 The key country characteristics included are differences in country size and differences in relative factor endowments. The difference in country size is the absolute difference between the real GDP of country i and country j (DY). Skills are defined according to employment categories, with skilled employees taken as those working in managerial and professional occupations. This is included as the absolute difference between the ratio of skilled labour to total employment in country i and country j (DSKILL). Capital is defined as the real gross fixed capital stock 7 . It is included as the absolute difference in the ratio of capital stock to total employment in country i and country j (DCAP).
We include four different measures of trade costs, to reflect different aspects such as natural barriers and man-made barriers 8 . One is a measure of freight costs, which is calculated by taking the ratio of bilateral imports with freight costs (c.i.f) to bilateral imports without freight costs (f.o.b) (FREIGHT). Previous attempts to construct a similar variable using OECD trade data have produced unrealistic estimates. For example, Harrigan (1993) calculated the ratio of OECD import values on a c.i.f. basis over the corresponding f.o.b.
basis for exports from the exporting country. This resulted in estimates of freight costs in excess of 500 percent, partly due to inconsistent reporting procedures between countries.
Using the US bilateral trade data collected by the NBER and described in Feenstra (1996) gives more credible estimates as they are based on two US data series. The mean value of the ratio is 1.05 indicating that transport costs are on average five percent of import values.
The highest value is 12 percent and the lowest 0.03 percent. Moreover, the variable is also systematically higher for countries a long distance from the US, and is generally decreasing over time. 9 Data are only available for freight costs on imports into the US on a bilateral 6 Trade in agriculture is excluded from the dependent variable, as there are other important factors driving it − such as the availability of natural resources − not included in the model we estimate. 7 The capital stock data were kindly provided by Keith Maskus. They are calculated as follows: figures for gross fixed capital formation (from IMF, International Financial Statistics) for a 15-year period (e.g. 1970-84), are deflated using local deflators and are then converted to US dollars using PPP exchange rates (from Penn World Tables). This resulted in the 1984 capital stock data. Mohan later updated this procedure to calculate capital stocks for 1985-94. Details of construction are in Maskus, 1991. 8 Note this is an improvement on previous studies such as Clausing (2000) that measures trade costs as the residuals from a regression of the ratio of imports to GDP on population and population squared. 9 Brainard (1993) uses freight charges relative to import values from the same source as a proxy for transport costs.
basis. As a result, we have assumed that costs are symmetric, i.e. that freight costs from the US to country j are the same as freight costs from country j to the US.
Our second variable reflects the incidence of tariffs. It is defined as the ratio of import duties paid in the US to total imports from country j to the US (DUTYSH). Since it is calculated from tariff revenues, it represents collected tariffs and thus reflects the actual incidence of tariff barriers. Unfortunately, it is not available for tariffs paid in country j from the US, so again we have had to assume that this incidence is symmetric. Another drawback of this measure is that it does not capture non-tariff barriers such as quotas. To address these shortcomings, we include a third measure, which is a simple average of several indices of impediments to trade taken from the World Competitiveness Report, as in Carr et al., 1998 . This index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values reflecting higher trade barriers 10 . Our fourth measure is distance, which is measured as the number of miles from each country's capital city to Washington DC.
A dummy variable for the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA) is also included, taking a value of one for Canada after 1989 and for Mexico from 1994. This captures the possibility that the level of integration among the three countries may have been affected by these agreements over and above that picked up by our import duty share variable 11 . We would expect the coefficient on NAFTA to be positive, reflecting the greater trade among these countries as a result of integration. We also include a dummy variable for countries that are members of the European Union (EU). As there may have been trade diversion from the US (and trade creation among EU countries) we expect the EU dummy to be negative. computed on a scale of 0 to 100, with a higher number indicating higher investment costs.
The index is calculated as a simple average of scores given to ten different questions.
10 It comes from a survey where companies are asked whether national protectionism prevents foreign products and services from being imported. 11 The duty share variable indicates a fall over the period from 0.9% to 0.3% and 3.1% to 1.3% for Canada and Mexico respectively from 1986 to 1994.
Details of the questions asked in calculating this index are provided in the Appendix. The survey is an extensive one: it is sent to top and middle executives in 47 countries. In 1999, it was reported that 4,160 executives completed and returned their questionnaires (World Competitiveness Yearbook, 1999) .
Results
The results from estimating equation (1) we report the results for both models. Furthermore, when estimating the fixed-effects model some variables need to be dropped (distance and the EU dummy) as they have no variation within bilateral relationships. The NAFTA dummy can remain as it has some variation over time. The results indicate that the signs on the coefficients are the same in both models and the significance levels do not alter substantially. countries that are more similar in size have higher bilateral exports (shown by the negative coefficient on DY, the difference in GDP) probably as a result of higher intra-industry trade. As traditional trade theory predicts, differences in relative factor endowments -in this case the difference in the skilled labour to unskilled labour ratios and capital to labour ratios -increase the volume of trade. As predicted, increases in trade costs reduce exports.
The three trade-cost variables included in the fixed effects model -the trade cost index, freight costs and the proportion of duties paid are all negative and significant. As expected, membership of NAFTA increases trade with the US. For the effects of EU membership and distance we need to refer to the random effects model, which indicates that membership of the EU leads to a fall in trade between EU countries and the US, possibly because of trade diversion. The distance variable is insignificant.
All the interactive terms have the hypothesised sign, except country size differences. Note that the coefficient on the interactive distance term (IC*DISTANCE) is negative. The theory does not give clear predictions on this as it could reflect trade costs or an investment cost, with the cost of monitoring foreign affiliates expected to rise with distance.
The coefficient on the interactive country size term (DY*IC) has an unexpected positive coefficient. We hypothesised that investment liberalisation between countries that differed in size would promote vertical FDI and hence increase trade. However, recall that the theory predicted a more complicated relationship than this. For example, the theory predicts that country size difference would promote vertical FDI only between countries that also differed in relative factor endowments, and particularly if the small country was the skill abundant country. To test this, we split the interactive country size term into three categories: (i) the source country is skill labour abundant; (ii) the two countries are similar in relative skill labour abundance; and (iii) the host country is skill labour abundant. It turns out that the coefficients on all these categories were positive and of a similar magnitude.
One possible explanation for this positive coefficient is that the third country effect is not picked up in these bilateral relationships. That is, vertical FDI may result in a fall in exports from country i to j but an overall increase in trade between country i, j and h. 
The results support our hypotheses. In Hypothesis 1, we stated that investment costs will reduce exports if countries are similar in size and relative factor endowments, and trade costs are medium to high. If we evaluate equation (3) for the case where countries are similar, by setting DY, DSKILL and DCAP to zero, we see that the cross-price elasticity, In Hypothesis 2 we stated that investment liberalisation would promote trade if countries differed in terms relative factor endowments and trade costs are low. If we evaluate equation (3) for low levels of trade costs the cross-price elasticity is likely to be negative as hypothesised since the coefficients on the relative factor endowments are negative.
However, these effects would have to outweigh the positive effect of country size difference.
Using data from the sample, we can evaluate equation (3) with the mean values of the data to see if the cross price elasticity is positive or negative. We find a small positive cross price elasticity of 0.2 for US exports to all the countries in the sample. Hence, a one percent decrease in investment costs in the partner countries will decrease the demand for US exports in those countries by just over 0.2 percent, indicating that FDI substitutes for trade.
In contrast, a one percent fall in investment costs in the US will increase US imports from the 35 partner countries on average by around 0.04 percent. However, this average effect across the sample masks much interesting information.
More information is gained by evaluating equation (3) at the annual mean values. We see from Table 2 that there has been a positive trend, beginning with a negative cross price elasticity in 1986 to a positive one in 1994 13 . The data indicate that the mean difference in country sizes between the US and the partner countries has increased over time, which would promote a positive relationship between investment costs and exports. Offsetting this is the increase in the differences in relative skill and capital abundance, and the fall in trade costs, promoting vertical FDI and hence a negative relationship, however these are dominated by size difference effects. The overall effect of investment costs on exports is conditional on the country characteristics and trade costs. To provide more insight into these relations, we hold the values of all the variables in equation (3) fixed at their means and vary one variable at a time to find the critical value that changes the sign of the derivative. For example, to find the critical value of DY * we estimate equation (3) at the mean values of all the variables (denoted by bars) in equation (4) (4) We repeat this exercise for all the other variables and summarise them in Table 3 below. As can be seen from Table 4 , there are observations that fall above and below all the critical values. For example, it is not the case that when we vary, say, distance holding all other variables constant at their means, that the cross-price elasticity is always negative. In 32 per cent of the cases the cross price elasticity is negative and in 68 percent it is positive. This implies that there is not one single dominant characteristic that is driving the results. In fact, evaluating equation (3) at the actual values for each observation, we found that 60 percent of the observations indicate a positive elasticity.
In Table 4 below, we see that there is a great deal of variation in the cross-price elasticities for each country pair. These are calculated from evaluating equation (3) using the mean values of variables for each country pair (which are listed in the Appendix). It is difficult to identify a common trend in Table 4 that would pinpoint a single country characteristic that drives the overall sign of the cross-price elasticity to be positive or negative, given the complex relationship between trade and investment costs as seen in equation (3) . However it is still interesting to see just how much variation there is across different countries. The largest positive elasticity is found for US exports to Greece -a one percent increase in investment costs in Greece will increase exports to Greece by over 40 percent. The largest negative value is for US exports to Chile, where a one percent increase in investment costs reduces US exports by over five percent.
In general the elasticities are larger for countries that have little trade with the US. For example, small European countries such as Greece, Finland, Denmark and Norway have large positive elasticities indicating that a small reduction in investment costs has a large negative impact on trade. In contrast, very small effects are noticeable with countries like
Canada that trade a lot with the US. This indicates that the elasticity is not constant -the absolute value of the elasticity is lower for higher levels of exports. 
V. Conclusions
Notes:
• For the trade data see NBER working paper series number 5515 and 5990 by Robert C. Feenstra for a detailed explanation of the data.
• The skill data: for Brazil and Sweden skills category 2 is included along with 3 (clerical and related staff).
As a result only skills category 0/1 over total employment is used as the skills variable. This is an underestimate relative to the other countries, but should capture the variation over time. In the cases when some years are missing for some countries the data have been filled in with the skills variable for the nearest year.
• Data were not available on skills for France from the same source. As a result the percentage of the workforce in professional and intermediate professions was used from 'Étude sur la marché du travail' 1997, European Commission.
Partner Countries:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Construction of IC index
The World Economic Forum conducts extensive surveys, in which it asks participants to give a score between 0 and 100 in response to a number of questions. The IC index is a simple average of the following scores:
